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OWe examined the efﬁcacy of a new approach to detect truths and lies in expressing opinions: the Devil'sAdvocate approach. Interviewees are ﬁrst asked an opinion eliciting question that asks participants to arguein favour of their personal view. This is followed by a Devil's Advocate question that asks participants to
argue against their personal view. People normally think more about reasons that support rather than
oppose their opinion. Therefore we expected truth tellers to provide more information and shorter latency
times in their responses to the opinion eliciting question than to the Devil's Advocate question. Liars are
expected to reveal the opposite pattern as the Devil's Advocate question is more compatible with their
beliefs than is the opinion eliciting question. In Experiment 1, we interviewed seventeen truth tellers and
liars via the Devil's Advocate approach and measured the difference in number of words and latency times to
the two questions. Our hypotheses were supported. In Experiment 2, 25 observers were shown these
interviews, and made qualitative judgements about the statements. Truth tellers' opinion eliciting answers
were seen as more immediate and plausible and revealed more emotional involvement than their Devil's
Advocate answers. No clear differences emerged in liars' answers to the two types of question. We conclude
that the Devil's Advocate approach is a promising lie detection approach that deserves attention in future
research.34
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ECSeveral lie detection tools have been designed to aid criminalinvestigators to distinguish between truths and lies. Two of these,Statement Validity Assessment (SVA) and Reality Monitoring (RM),
are the most widely researched (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero,
2005; Vrij, 2005, 2008). The core of SVA is Criteria-Based Content
Analysis (CBCA), a list of 19 criteria that are thought to occur more
often in truthful than in deceptive accounts (Köhnken & Steller, 1988;
Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Undeutsch, 1984). Vrij (2008) reviewed
more than 50 CBCA studies, and found that several of these criteria
discriminated reasonably well between truths and lies. A review of
more than 20 RM studies showed a similar picture (Vrij, 2008).
Several of the eight RM criteria discriminated reasonably well
between truths and lies. CBCA and RM were designed to distinguish
between truths and lies when people describe events that they claim
they have experienced (e.g., being sexually abused). As a result, many
CBCA and RM criteria focus on perceptual detail and examine what
people report that they saw, heard, felt or smelled during these
events.
Sometimes, however, it is important to distinguish between
truthful and untruthful reports of people's opinions, where the topic79
80
81
82described by the person is not perceptual, but conceptual. In this type
of deception-detection task, perceptually oriented tools such as CBCA
and RM are inadequate. The goal of the present study was to develop a
more conceptually oriented tool to discriminate between truthful and
false beliefs. Determining the veracity of conceptual representations
may not be important in typical police suspect interviews because
these are mainly concerned with examining lying about transgres-
sions. However, it can be important in many security settings, for
example when deciding whether an informant is indeed as much (i)
anti-Taliban or (ii) against Muslim fundamentalism as s/he claims or
(iii) whether the sole reason for entering the UK or the US is indeed to
study at a University. Incorrect veracity judgements can do irreparable
harm in such situations, as demonstrated by the loss of seven CIA
agents in Afghanistan on 30 December 2009. The CIA agents were
killed via a suicide attack by a man they thought was going to give
them information about Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan's
tribal areas. The CIAwas aware that theman had posted extreme anti-
American views on the internet. However, it was decided that the
views he had expressed were part of a good cover, and the possibility
that they were his real views was discounted (The Sunday Times, 10
January, 2010).
In order to detect truths and lies about opinions we designed the
Devil's Advocate approach. It consists of two questions. First, after






































































































































in Iraq”), the investigator asks an opinion eliciting question: “What do
you think led to you having that opinion about this topic?” This
question is then followed by the second question, the Devil's
Advocate question: “Playing Devil's Advocate, is there anything you
can say against/in favour of this topic?” (Interviewer asks ‘against’ if
the interviewee had expressed a positive attitude towards the topic
and ‘in favour’ if the interviewee had expressed a negative attitude
towards the topic.)
The Devil's Advocate approach invites truth tellers to give reasons
that support their true opinion in the opinion eliciting and to give
reasons that oppose their true opinion in the Devil's Advocate answer.
People tend to seek information that conﬁrms rather than disconﬁrms
their views (so-called conﬁrmation bias, Darley & Gross, 1983), and are
therefore likely to be able to generate more reasons that support
rather than oppose their opinion (Ajzen, 2001; Waenke & Bless,
2000). In addition, people's knowledge about their own beliefs is
likely to be more sophisticated and reﬁned than their knowledge
about other beliefs. Therefore, a truth teller's answer to the opinion
eliciting question is likely to contain more words than his/her answer
to the Devil's Advocate question.
The Devil's Advocate approach has the opposite effect on liars.
They must manipulate their thoughts in an unnatural fashion. Liars
are invited to give reasons that support their true opinion in the
Devil's Advocate question and to give reasons that oppose their
true opinion in the opinion eliciting question. Liars may therefore
provide longer answers to the Devil's Advocate question than to
the opinion eliciting question because, for liars, the Devil's
Advocate question is more compatible with their beliefs than is
the opinion eliciting question. There is a complication, however.
Liars will attempt to mask their true opinion. In doing so they may
attempt to generate as many reasons as they can think of in their
opinion eliciting answers, and may attempt to restrain themselves
from giving too many reasons in their Devil's Advocate answers. If
they are successful in doing this, they, just like truth tellers, will
give longer answers to the opinion eliciting question than to the
Devil's Advocate question. Liars may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to fully employ
this latter strategy, however. First, liars probably can think of many
more reasons to report in the Devil's Advocate answer than in the
opinion eliciting answer. Only providing a selection of those
reasons in the Devil's Advocate answer may already result in
providing more information than they can generate in the opinion
eliciting answer. Second, liars may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to restrain
themselves from providing information in the Devil's Advocate
answer as people typically have a strong desire to speak out about
topics they care about (Hayes, 2007; Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan,
2005; Hayes, Shanahan, & Glynn, 2001; Kim, Han, Shanahan, &
Berdayes, 2004; Willnat, Lee, & Detenber, 2002). We therefore
predict that truth tellers' answers to the opinion eliciting question
will contain more words than their answers to the Devil's Advocate
question, whereas liars' answers to the opinion eliciting question
will be shorter or of equal length as their answers to the Devil's
Advocate question.
Reasons that support an opinion are likely to be more readily
available in someone's mind than reasons that oppose an opinion
(Fazio, 1990; Tesser, 1978). Truth tellers therefore should reveal
shorter latency times (time between a question asked and the answer
given) when answering the opinion eliciting question than the Devil's
Advocate question. Liars' latency times are more difﬁcult to predict. In
theory they should display the longest latency times for the opinion
eliciting question. However, they may attempt to mask the fact that
they are lying, which could, for example, result in the same latency
time for both questions. We therefore predict that truth teller's
latency time will be shorter for the opinion eliciting question than for
the Devil's Advocate question, whereas liars' latency time for the
opinion eliciting question will be longer or of equal length as their









A total of 17 undergraduate students took part in this experiment,
7 (41%) males and 10 (59%) females. Their average age was
M=25.76 years (SD=1.59).
1.1.2. Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the Psychology Department of
the University of Portsmouth. The experiment was advertised via
posters distributed around the building, asking for students to
participate in a study that investigates people's opinions on various
contentious issues. The posters informed potential participants that
they could earn £10 for taking part.
Participants were informed that the experimenters were investi-
gating people's opinions and arguments for and against various issues.
After consenting to the study, participants completed an Opinions
Questionnaire which asked the extent to which they agreed or
disagreed (where 1=agree and 7=disagree) with 25 different
statements (e.g. ‘Women should have the right to an abortion’, ‘Gay
couples should have the same rights to adopt a child as heterosexual
couples’, ‘The UK immigration laws should be much tougher’, ‘The
invasion of Iraq was necessary’). Finally the participants were asked
via a 7-point Likert scale ranging from [1] not at all to [7] completely,
the extent to which they had ﬁlled out the questionnaire truthfully
(11 participants ticked ‘7’ on this scale and 6 ticked ‘6’, M=6.65,
SD=.49).
After completing the questionnaire, participants were taken into
another room where the experimenter gave them a consent form
outlining the next stage of the experiment. After reading this synopsis,
all participants agreed to continue, and signed this consent form. Then
the experimenter and participant together looked through the
participant's completed Opinions Questionnaire and selected a
statement that the participant had indicated strong agreement or
disagreement with. Participants were then asked to lie about their
opinion (N=8) or truthfully argue their opinion (N=9) in a
subsequent interview. They were told that they would earn £10 if
they were able to convince the interviewer that they were telling the
truth. The experimenter noted on a slip of paper the question number
from the questionnaire that the interviewer was to question the
participants about. The interviewer was blind to the participant's
truth, and did not knowwhat opinion (for or against) the participants
were going to express until the interview commenced.
The participants were then taken into the interview room. The
interviewer ﬁrst asked each participant his/her opinion about a topic:
“What is your opinion about this topic?” This question was followed
by the opinion eliciting question: “What do you think led to you having
that opinion about this topic?” which was followed by the Devil's
Advocate question: “Playing Devil's Advocate, is there anything you
can say in favour/against this topic?” (Interviewer asked ‘in favour’ if
the participant had expressed a negative attitude towards the topic
and ‘against’ if the interviewee had expressed a positive attitude
towards the topic.) During the interviews, nine participants told the
truth and eight lied.
After the participants had answered the two questions, they were
brought back into the room where they had just been briefed. The
experimenter then debriefed the participants and ‘checked’ with the
interviewer whether he had believed the participant. Regardless of his
answer, all participants were told that the interviewer had believed them
and were given £10 as a result. This was considered fair and ethical.
1.1.3. Dependent variables
All interviews were transcribed, and based on these transcripts we





















































































































and Devil's Advocate questions (via the Word count option). One
coder, blind to the veracity of the statements, measured the latency
time for the opinion eliciting and Devil's Advocate questions. The
latency time was deﬁned as the time between the question asked and
the beginning of the actual answers, ignoring uhms, errs and
repetitions of the question. For inter-rater reliability purposes, a
second coder, blind to the veracity of the statements, also measured
the latency times. A Pearson correlation revealed that the latency time
scoring was reliable (r=.93 for opinion eliciting question and r=.67
for Devil's Advocate question).
1.2. Results
A 2 (Veracity)×2 (Question) mixed ANOVA with Veracity as
between-subjects factor and Question as within-subjects factor and
the number of words as the dependent variable revealed one effect, a
signiﬁcant Veracity×Question interaction, F(1, 15)=5.19, pb .05,
eta2=.26. Table 1 reveals that truth tellers said signiﬁcantly more
words when answering the opinion eliciting question than when
answering the Devil's Advocate question. In contrast, liars said fewer
words when answering the opinion eliciting question than when
answering the Devil's Advocate question (albeit not signiﬁcantly less
(p=.21)).
A 2 (Veracity)×2 (Question) mixed ANOVA with Veracity as
between-subjects factor, Question as within-subjects factor and
latency time as dependent variable revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
for Question, F(1, 15)=4.53, pb .05, eta2=.23, and a signiﬁcant
Veracity×Question interaction effect, F(1, 15)=4.24, p=.05,
eta2=.22. The Question main effect revealed that the latency time
for the opinion eliciting question was shorter (M=2.18, SD=2.15)
than the latency time for the Devil's Advocate question (M=4.13,
SD=2.6). Table 1 reveals that truth tellers displayed a signiﬁcantly
shorter latency time when answering the opinion eliciting question
than when answering the Devil's Advocate question, whereas liars'
latency times did not differ between the two types of question.
1.3. Discussion
Comparing the number of words to the Devil's Advocate question
and the opinion eliciting question was a useful tool to detect deceit.
Truth tellers said more when answering the opinion eliciting question
than when answering the Devil's Advocate question. This appears
plausible. Truth tellers can think of more reasons to support their own
opinion (opinion eliciting question) than to contradict their own
opinion (Devil's Advocate question) (Ajzen, 2001; Waenke & Bless,
2000). This is, of course, the same for liars. They also can think of more
reasons to support than to contradict their real opinion, and that
makes answering the Devil's Advocate question difﬁcult for them. In
order to avoid getting caught, liars should restrain themselves from
expressing too much of their true opinion in answer to the Devil's
Advocate question because that may reveal deceit. The ﬁndings
















A comparison between the number of words and latency time in the answers to the





F eta2 d p
M SD M SD
Number of words
Truth 56.00 31.3 35.22 20.6 4.71* .37 .80 .04
Lie 69.88 71.4 96.38 48.5 1.90 .21 .44 .21
Latency time
Truth 1.35 .5 4.99 3.0 11.80** .60 2.06 .009
Lie 3.10 2.9 3.16 1.8 .00 .00 .03 .97






more when answering the Devil's Advocate question than when
answering the opinion eliciting question. The ﬁnding that truth tellers
said more when expressing their true beliefs than their counter-
beliefs is obviously not new as this has been demonstrated in classic
social psychological research on attitudes. The ﬁnding, however, that
liars did not succeed in masking this tendency had not been examined
before, and it is this failure thatmakes the Devil's Advocate approach a
useful tool to detect deceit.
Comparing the latency time for the Devil's Advocate question and
the opinion eliciting question was another diagnostic tool to detect
deceit. Truth tellers displayed the shortest latency times when
answering the opinion eliciting question, probably because the
reasons that support an opinion (opinion eliciting question) are
more readily available to them than reasons that oppose an opinion
(Devil's Advocate question). The opposite is true for liars, for them the
answers to the Devil's Advocate question should be more available.
Yet, liars did not display a difference in latency times when answering
the opinion eliciting and Devil's Advocate questions. A possible reason
is that liars attempted to display the same latency time for both types
of question, assuming that this neutral, undifferentiated pattern,
would not reveal their lies. They miscalculated in not realising that
truth tellers would have a shorter latency time for the opinion
eliciting question. Another explanation is that liars found answering
the two types of question equally difﬁcult. The difﬁculty for them in
answering the Devil's Advocate question may have been caused by
impression management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). That is, they may
have faced difﬁculty in presenting the reasons they generated in such
a manner that they would not appear to be their true opinion. Given
that we obtained a null effect for liars (e.g., no difference), we cannot
rule out an alternative explanation, that liars' latency times were
random. Whether the null effect has been caused by active control,
cognitive load or randomness is a question for future research.
We found parallel results on the two different dependent
variables. Truth tellers provided more complete (e.g., number of
words) and more accessible (e.g., latency time) answers to opinion
eliciting questions than to Devil's Advocate questions. At one level,
this is anomalous, as it should take longer to ﬁnd amore complex than
a simple mental representation. For instance, Sternberg (1966) found
that it takes longer to compare a test letter to a largermemory set than
to a smaller memory set. Comparable ﬁndings are observed in other
cognitive tasks. For instance, it takes longer to initiate an utterance if
the sentence is long and syntactically complex than short and simple
(Ferreira, 1991) and it takes longer to initiate a complex motor
response than a simple motor response (Osman, Kornblum, & Meyer,
1990). But in our study, truth tellers required less time to initiate
longer answers (opinion eliciting) than shorter answers. This complex
pattern of results suggests that neither the length of answer data nor
the latency to reply data can be accounted for by a simple explanation
that addresses only one measure. Rather, it appears that truth tellers'
beliefs are represented in a qualitatively different fashion – that is
more complex yet more accessible – than their non-beliefs (Devil's
Advocate question). We assume that the thought representations of
these opinions have become better integrated into their general
knowledge system, thereby providing more links to other concepts
and also more potential retrieval cues (see Anderson, 2000). The
Devil's Advocate paradigm simply exploits this mental representation
to increase discrimination between truth tellers and liars.
The patterns found here in the Devil's Advocate paradigm are
conceptually similar to the results we found in earlier studies in which
we asked liars and truth tellers questions that they either did or did
not anticipate (Vrij et al., 2009). Liars and truth tellers were equally
consistent in their responses on questions that they could anticipate,
but liars were less consistent than truth tellers on questions that they
could not anticipate (see also Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003).
In some ways, the Devil's Advocate question functions like an






































































































































who must construct an ad-hoc reply that will not give away their true
mental representation: Slower access and less complete answer to the
Devil's Advocate question than to the opinion eliciting question. For
truth tellers, however, the Devil's Advocate question is not problem-
atic, as they just naturally provide a slower and less complex response.
We believe that, as a general strategy for detecting deception,
investigators should exploit liars' inability to conceal their deception
to such unanticipated questions.
We always asked the two questions in the same order and the
Devil's Advocate question always followed the opinion eliciting
question. We believe this is the natural way of asking the questions,
as inviting interviewees to argue against their belief (e.g., Devil's
Advocate question) before asking them to argue in favour of their
belief (e.g., opinion eliciting question) will appear odd. Whether the
order of asking the questions has an effect on the efﬁcacy of the lie
detection tool is an empirical question. Given that changing the order
appears odd, doing this is recommended only when it increases the lie
detection ability of the approach. We cannot think of a compelling
theoretical reason why it would.
We measured only one dependent variable: The number of words.
Of course, other measurements would be relevant too, such as the
number of ideas expressed or the complexity of these ideas. We
restricted ourselves to the number of words because this variable can
be measured easily and objectively unlike the other variables. The
disadvantage of using number of words is that it gives no insight into
the content of the answers. Also, unless there is a transcript of the
interview, there will usually be no indication of the number of words
spoken. Rather, the deception detector would have only a subjective,
global measure of how wordy the suspect appeared. We therefore
carried out a second experiment in which the statements were
analysed in a qualitative manner.
In Experiment 2 we showed observers a selection of Experiment
1's videotaped interviews with truth tellers and liars (hereafter called
‘senders’ following common deception research procedure). We
measured three qualitative cues to deception: Plausibility, immediacy
and involvement. We based these cues on a meta-analysis of
deception research revealing that these three cues discriminate
between truth tellers and liars (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). We
are aware that DePaulo et al.'s meta-analysis revealed more verbal
cues to deception than these three cues. We chose those three cues as
they are key cues that cover many other cues. For example, another
diagnostic cue to deceit is the number of contradictions (DePaulo et
al., 2003). Contradictions, however, are covered by plausibility as
contradictions would lead to implausibility (but, obviously, implau-
sibility is more than just contradictions).
Truthful stories typically sound more plausible than deceptive
stories. Moreover, truth tellers are typicallymore immediate than liars
(give more examples of personal experiences and more to-the-point
answers) and show more emotional involvement with the topic they
discuss (feel more strongly about the topic). We thus informed the
observers that truth tellers are likely to give more plausible and
immediate answers that reveal involvement to the opinion eliciting
questions than to the Devil's Advocate questions and that the opposite
may occur in liars.
In addition, we asked the observers to rate senders' talkativeness
in answering the opinion eliciting and Devil's Advocate questions. We
thought this to be a subjective substitute of counting the number of
words. We further informed the senders that truth tellers are likely to
be more talkative when answering the opinion eliciting questions
than the Devil's Advocate questions and that the opposite may occur
in liars.
Observers are generally poor at detecting truths and lies when
judging videotapes and typically achieve accuracy rates only just
above the level of chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). We
expected to achieve more substantial accuracy rates in the present






tellers and liars in Experiment 1 and (ii) the observers received




A total of 25 observers took part, 5 males (20%) and 20 females
(80%). Their average age was M=20.96 years (SD=3.67).
2.1.2. Procedure
The experiment took place at the Students' Union of the University
of Portsmouth. Observers were tested simultaneously in small groups
sized between four and eight, sitting far enough apart so as not to see
each other's answers. Observers were given questionnaires and were
asked to complete the ﬁrst section relating to demographics. They
were then informed that they were about to see a selection of clips of
students (called ‘senders’) who were either telling the truth or lying
when expressing their opinion about a contentious issue. The
experimenter did not tell the observers how many clips they would
see, or what percentage were truths or lies, so as to avoid observers
attempting to calculate how many truths and lies they were actually
being shown, and hence deliberately trying to achieve a certain
number of truth/lie responses. Instead they were informed that
although theywould not be told howmany clips theywould see, there
would not be as many clips as were in their questionnaire. The
videotaped interviews were shown on a large screen (approximately
2 m×1 m).
We showed the observers 14 interviews containing the questions
and answers to the opinion eliciting and Devil's Advocate questions:
Seven senders lied and seven told the truth. For practical purposes, we
selected the ﬁrst 14 interviews from Experiment 1 (thus leaving out
the interviews of senders 15–17). The experiment took just under 1 h
to run, but would have lasted more than 1 h if we had shown all 17
interviews. Our experience is that observers are more willing to take
part in experiments that are completed within an hour than in
experiments than take longer than 1 h.
Before the lie detection task started the observers were told that
research has shown that compared to liars, truth tellers appear to be
more talkative, more immediate and more emotionally involved, and
that truthful stories are likely to sound more plausible than deceptive
stories. Immediate was deﬁned as ‘gives examples of personal
experiences and to-the-point answers’, whereas emotional involve-
ment was deﬁned as ‘feels strongly about the topic’.
We then explained what the opinion eliciting and Devil's Advocate
questions entailed. After this, we told the observers that if the four
speech characteristics (talkative, immediate, emotional involvement
and plausibility) were more often/stronger present during the
opinion eliciting answer than during the Devil's Advocate answer,
the sender is likely to be telling the truth and, vice versa, if these
speech characteristics were less present during the opinion eliciting
answer than during the Devil's Advocate answer, the sender is likely
to be lying.
The lie detection task then commenced. Each of the 14 interviews
shown to the observers consisted of the two questions (opinion
eliciting and Devil's Advocate) and the answers to these questions.
Each time after the answer to the opinion eliciting question the
videotape was stopped and the observers were asked to report the
extent to which they believed the sender was (i) talkative, (ii)
immediate, (iii) emotionally involved and, (iv) the extent to which
the story was plausible. Answers were given on 7-point Likert scales
ranging from [1] deﬁnitely not to [7] deﬁnitely. The same questions
were also asked each time after the answer to the Devil's Advocate
question. After the Devil's Advocate question the observers were also
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think that the sender is telling… (dichotomous answer, the truth/a
lie)?’; and ‘To what extent do you think the sender is lying?’ Answers
were given on 7 point Likert scales ranging from [1] deﬁnitely not to
[7] deﬁnitely.
Accuracy was measured by calculating the percentage of correct
veracity judgements given by each observer in judging the truthful
clips (N=7, truth accuracy) and deceptive clips (N=7, lie accuracy).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Veracity judgements: Dichotomous answers
A one-way ANOVA with Veracity as the factor and the dichoto-
mous accuracy rates as the dependent variable revealed that truths
were detected more accurately (M=.77, SD=.22) than lies (M=.49,
SD=.15), F(1, 24)=21.96, pb .01, eta2=.48, d=1.51. Truths were
detected above the level of chance, t(24)=5.60, pb .01, whereas lies
were not, t(24)=.47, ns. The observers had a truth bias and judged
the interviewees as truthful in 61% of their judgements. This is more
than could be expected by chance, t(24)=4.52, pb .01. A truth bias is a
common ﬁnding in lie detection research (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij,
2008), particularly when the observers are not police (Mann, Vrij, &
Bull, 2004; Meissner & Kassin, 2002, 2004).
2.2.2. Veracity judgements: Likert scale answers
A one-way ANOVA with Veracity as the factor and the Likert
veracity judgements as the dependent variable revealed that the
observers discriminated between truth tellers and liars, F(1, 24)=
26.47, pb .01, eta2=.53, d=1.29. Liars were viewed as more
deceptive (M=3.83, SD=.61) than truth tellers (M=2.86, SD=.89).
2.2.3. Judgements of speech characteristics
A 2 (Veracity)×2 (Question) MANOVA with talkativeness,
immediacy, emotional involvement, and plausibility as the dependent
variables revealed a signiﬁcant Veracity main effect, F(4, 21)=6.32,
pb .01, eta2=.55, a signiﬁcant Question main effect, F(4, 21)=26.81,
pb .01, eta2=.84, and a signiﬁcant Veracity×Question interaction
effect, F(4, 21)=30.04, pb .01, eta2=.85. The signiﬁcant Veracity×-
Question interaction effect is the most informative of these three
effects. At a univariate level, the interaction effects were signiﬁcant for
each of the four speech characteristics (all FsN48.82, all psb .01, all
eta2N .66, see Table 2).
Table 2 shows that the observers noticed clear differences between
the answers to the opinion eliciting and Devil's Advocate questions in
truth tellers. They found the truth tellers more talkative, immediate,UN
CO





F(1, 24) eta2 d
M SD M SD
Being talkative
Truth 4.93 .58 3.76 .75 117.80⁎⁎ .82 1.83
Lie 4.93 .63 4.59 .56 9.83⁎ .29 .58
Immediate
Truth 5.06 .62 3.57 .76 163.06⁎⁎ .87 2.16
Lie 4.73 .55 4.51 .67 3.90 .14 .36
Emotionally involved
Truth 4.64 .57 3.37 .60 65.47⁎⁎ .73 2.17
Lie 4.19 .51 3.96 .69 3.75 .14 .38
Plausible
Truth 5.22 .57 4.30 .59 74.93⁎⁎ .76 1.59
Lie 4.82 .54 4.80 .57 .06 .00 .04
⁎ pb .05.
⁎⁎ pb .01.






and emotionally involved when answering the opinion eliciting
question than when answering the Devil's Advocate question, and
also found the truth tellers' answers to the opinion eliciting question
more plausible than their answers to the Devil's Advocate question.
The results for liars, however, show a different picture. The
observers did not see much difference between liars' answers to the
two types of question. The only difference they noticed was in talking
time, and they found the liars more talkative when answering the
opinion eliciting question than when answering the Devil's Advocate
question.
2.2.4. Assessing speech characteristics: Its potential for lie detection
Finally, we calculated the potential for lie detection on the basis of
the observers' assessments. We calculated the total perception scores
for each of the 14 senders that the observers assessed. First, for each of
the four verbal cues we subtracted the observers' Devil's Advocate
scores for each sender from their opinion eliciting scores. Second, we
calculated a total perception score, which is the summation of these
four scores. We considered summation scores greater than 4 to be
high. Scores greater than 4 indicate that the sender obtained, on
average for each verbal cue, at least one point higher on the 7-point
Likert scale for the opinion eliciting question than for the Devil's
Advocate question. For lie detection purposes, those with high
positive scores should be considered truth tellers, whereas the others
should be considered liars. Table 3 shows the scores for each verbal
cue and the total perception scores for the seven truth tellers and
seven liars. The total perception score is presented in the last column.
Table 3 shows that the scores for truth tellers and liars differed
considerably. Three out of seven liars obtained a negative total
perception score, whereas no truth teller did. Six out of seven truth
tellers obtained a high positive score (greater than 4), whereas only
two liars did. The decision rule that those with high scores (greater
than 4) should be considered truth tellers and the others should be
considered liars leads to correctly classifying six out of seven truth
tellers (86%) and ﬁve out of seven liars (71%). This results in a total
correct classiﬁcation of 11 out of 14 interviewees (79%).
2.3. General discussion
The Devil's Advocate approach can be used to detect deceit when
people express their opinions. Our analyses of response length
revealed that truth tellers give longer answers to opinion eliciting
questions than to Devil's Advocate questions, whereas liars give
longer answers to Devil's Advocate questions than to opinion eliciting
questions (see Table 1). In addition, our analyses of latency timesTable 3 t3:1









t3:4Truth teller 1 .84 1.60 .80 1.00 4.24
t3:5Truth teller 2 1.48 1.40 1.00 .56 4.44
t3:6Truth teller 3 1.32 2.00 2.24 1.08 6.64
t3:7Truth teller 4 .04 .44 .08 .72 1.28
t3:8Truth teller 5 1.24 1.32 1.08 1.00 4.64
t3:9Truth teller 6 1.48 .72 1.68 .56 4.44
t3:10Truth teller 7 3.24 2.92 2.00 3.20 11.36
t3:11Liar 1 − .44 −1.33 − .68 − .48 −2.93
t3:12Liar 2 − .16 − .70 − .16 − .16 −1.28
t3:13Liar 3 1.68 1.76 1.12 1.12 5.68
t3:14Liar 4 − .44 − .28 − .40 − .40 −1.52
t3:15Liar 5 .16 .24 .20 .12 .72
t3:16Liar 6 .28 .40 .32 .20 1.20
t3:17Liar 7 1.12 1.52 1.32 .72 4.68























































































































revealed that truth tellers display shorter latency times to opinion
eliciting questions than to Devil's Advocate questions, whereas liars'
latency times did not differ between the two types of question (see
Table 1). When we based our decisions on the observers' assessments
of the speech characteristics of the truth tellers and liars (in terms of
being talkative, immediate, emotionally involved and plausible) 85%
of truth tellers and 71% of liars were correctly classiﬁed when
applying the following rule: Those who score clearly higher in terms
of being talkative, immediate, emotionally involved and plausible on
opinion eliciting questions than on Devil's Advocate questions should
be considered truth tellers, whereas the others should be considered
liars (see Table 3).
Observers' veracity assessments yielded a high truth accuracy rate
(77%) but a low lie accuracy rate (49%). The results for the speech
characteristics explains why observers obtained a high truth accuracy
rate but had difﬁculty in pinpointing liars. The observers noticed clear
differences in truth tellers. Observers found them more talkative,
immediate, emotionally involved and plausible when answering
opinion eliciting questions than when answering Devil's Advocate
questions. In contrast, the observers did not see much difference
between the liars' answers to the opinion eliciting and Devil's
Advocate questions. The only difference they noticed was in talking
time, and they found the liars more talkative when answering the
opinion eliciting question than when answering the Devil's Advocate
question.1 In other words, deceit is indicated by the absence of
differences between the two types of question. Judging veracity based
on the absence of certain cues is considerably more difﬁcult than
judging veracity based on the presence of some cues (as is the case
with truth tellers), as people normally respond to the presence of a
signal rather than to the absence of a signal.
Why were the answers of liars to both questions so similar? We
have argued that liars may have attempted to mask their true opinion,
but could not restrain themselves enough in the Devil's Advocate
question. An alternative explanation is that liars deliberately tried to
provide answers of similar quality to both types of question. Theymay
have done so because they may have thought that an absence of
differences would be the best lie strategy. This is often the case, as
people normally respond to the presence of a signal (see above).
However, it does not work in the Devil's Advocate approach because
truth tellers do not display such an ‘absence of cues’ strategy in this
approach.
This is only the ﬁrst test of the Devil's Advocate lie detection
technique but the results are encouraging. One beneﬁt of the
technique is that it is a within-subjects lie detection technique.
Therefore, the Devil's Advocate approach does not suffer from a
common problem in lie detection: How to deal with individual
differences. Such differences can be substantial. For example, some
people naturally talk more than others, and some people naturally
showmore emotional involvement than others. Individual differences
are irrelevant in the Devil's Advocate lie detection approach as these
differences cancel themselves out.
The Results of Experiment 2 were still based on group means
judgements, that is, on the results of the 25 observers as a whole. Of
course, there could be individual differences in the observers' ability
to apply the Devil's Advocate method. By means of a meta-analysis
Bond and DePaulo (2008) have recently examined individual











1 The ﬁnding that observers found the liars more talkative when answering the
opinion eliciting question than when answering the Devil's Advocate question does
not replicate the ﬁndings of Experiment 1. In that experiment no signiﬁcant difference
was found in the number of words mentioned by liars when answering the Devil's
Advocate question and the opinion eliciting question. Perhaps for the observers in
Experiment 2, ‘talkativeness’ was not equal to the number of words used. With
hindsight it is unfortunate that we did not give the observers in Experiment 2 more
guidance about how we deﬁned talkativeness.






the individual differences typically found in detection deception
studies are small and do not differ from what could be expected by
chance.We assume that the same conclusion could apply to the ability
to effectively use the Devil's Advocate approach.
After this initial success of the Devil's Advocate approach more
research is desirable. Future research could focus on why liars
displayed an absence of difference in the two types of questions, as
outlined above. In addition, future research could focus on other
differences between truth tellers and liars than those examined here.
For example, the complexity and sophistication of the arguments in
true support of one's belief could well be greater than the complexity
and sophistication of counter-belief arguments. Also, since arguments
that support a belief are more readily available in someone's mind,
interviewees may well pause less before discussing their true beliefs
than their counter-beliefs (i.e., shorter onset times), and may speak
faster when discussing their true beliefs than their counter-beliefs.
Future research could also examine the vulnerability of the Devil's
Advocate approach to countermeasures. That is, do interviewees who
are aware of the approach manage to give answers that fool lie
detectors? Employing countermeasures in the Devil's Advocate
approach may be more difﬁcult than in many other lie detection
techniques. Countermeasures are typically nonverbal, such as artiﬁ-
cially increasing the level of arousal during control questions in
polygraph tests (Honts & Amato, 2002). Although these counter-
measures might be effective for an arousal-based assessment of
deception (Honts & Amato, 2002), they should not inﬂuence the
patterns we observed here, based on the amount of information
provided. The problem liars face in the Devil's Advocate approach is
that they should use verbal countermeasures, and that these verbal
answers vary with the topics that will be discussed. As long as liars do
not know the topic that will be discussed, they cannot effectively
prepare their answers.
Research could also examinewhich factors inﬂuence the efﬁcacy of
the Devil's Advocate approach. For example, if someone has engaged
in serious debate about a particular topic (e.g., abortion), then he or
she might already have heard the opposing arguments, which may
make it easier to express them. Therefore, the Devil's Advocate
approach may work better when someone has not engaged much in
discussion about a topic than when someone has. We think that this
does not dilute the utility of the technique for exposing terrorists,
fanatics and fundamentalists. Those people have extreme views and
typically interact with others who have similar extreme views. When
people with extreme views get together, opinions opposing the
opinions of the groups as a whole are rarely heard, as research on
group polarisation (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969) and groupthink
(Janis, 1982) have demonstrated.
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